NATIONAL AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
RESEARCH CENTER OF ECONOMIC POLICY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

**BRIEF POLICY NOTE**

# AFRICA AND EU FINANCING TOOLS

PAVLOS PETIDIS

FEBRUARY 2020

## 1. Introduction

The strong alliance between Africa and Europe is based on geographical proximity and old historical links, and its strategic relevance has been developing in a dynamic geopolitical context[1]. The EU has made significant attempts to elevate the collaboration above the usual 'donor-recipient relationship. This collaboration is based on shared similar interests. Africa's most significant economic partner and a primary source of foreign investment, official development assistance (ODA), and humanitarian relief are the EU and its Member States. The EU and its Member States spent €75.2 billion on ODA in 2019, accounting for 55.2 percent of overall global assistance[2]. In 2018, the overall goods trade between the EU-27 and Africa was valued at €235 billion, according to the European Commission[3]. Aid and trade preferences have dominated European economic strategy toward Africa, which has been supplemented by talks aimed at improving domestic policies, governance, and the investment climate in partner nations[4].

Africa has both opportunities and challenges from the EU's perspective. Africa is a significant partner in multilateral fora and a source of critical natural resources on the one hand. It is also a rising market with expanding importance, especially when the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) came into force in early 2021, bringing 54 countries and almost a billion people together. It does, however, contain some of the world's most vulnerable and least developed countries, which are sources of poverty, migration, and prolonged violence. This has an implication on how the EU's foreign policy and development assistance are formed and deployed, particularly on a differing continent like Africa. The EU strives to strike a balance between security concerns and the more significant development objective while also remembering that other global entities are increasingly challenging their role in Africa[5].

For the past 20 years, the Cotonou Agreement has influenced most EU-Sub-Saharan Africa ties. It was supposed to conclude in 2020, but it was extended until 2021. After more than two years of negotiations, the EU and the Organization of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP) signed a successor agreement in April 2021, which contains a mutual ground for all

[1] Osondu-Oti, 2020
[2] The Africa-EU Partnership, 2021
[3] Pichon, 2021
[4] Brozou, 2021a
[5] Pichon, 2021

ACP countries as well as three distinct regional protocols[6], one of which is for Africa (excluding North Africa). This important difference would enable the EU to customize its cooperation objectives to each group of countries. The Commission adopted a joint communication detailing the steps toward a new Africa strategy in 2020. It recognizes the EU's interdependence with Africa, as well as the need for a revived comprehensive engagement based on common interests, as well as support for the UN Agenda 2030 and its SDGs. A sequence of European Parliament briefings covers governance, security and migration, development, humanitarian relief, climate change, trade and investment, and other facets of the new alliance.

The European Parliament passed a resolution in March 2021 outlining a strategy for new EU-Africa cooperation, highlighting the need for the EU and Africa to "move beyond the donor-recipient relationship." It designates a number of critical issues that must be addressed in light of the post-pandemic situation and the need to fully realize Africa's potential. These developments come before the new strategy's acceptance at the sixth EU-African Union Summit, scheduled for later in 2021. Because of the strategic importance of the EU-Africa alliance, resources mobilized to strengthen it must be matched. The novel Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – the Global Europe Instrument of the 2021-2027 MFF – allocates a major fraction of its funds to Sub-Saharan Africa (€29.1 billion) and the EU Neighbourhood (€19.3 billion), which encompasses North Africa. Furthermore, to mobilize private funding and maximize the impact of various financial instruments, the EU has prioritized tighter coordination with EU Member States and organizations, especially development finance institutions[7].

## 2. Financing in the 2021-2027 MFF

The goal is to boost investment by expanding on existing projects such as the external investment plan and the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs[8]. The MFFs (long-term budgets) of the EU fund programs are divided into different heads (expenditure categories), each addressing a particular policy area. Since January 2021, the MFF 2021-2027 has been in effect. Despite some consistency, the financing of external activity has changed significantly since the MFF for 2014-2020. The goal for the future term was to make EU action more coordinated and coherent and ensure the flexibility needed to respond quickly to new crises or problems, in keeping with the findings made by examining past instruments

[6] Bøås, M., Horký-Hlucháň, O., & A., 2020
[7] Jones, Keijzer & Veron 2020
[8] Brozou, 2021b

for external finance[9]. Furthermore, the new MFF aspires to address the fragmentation of external finance mechanisms, thereby improving budget unity and effectively responding to a dynamic international setting where the complexity and intensity of challenges are unlikely to diminish.

Different policy frameworks govern the EU's relations with Africa and individual countries. While the joint Africa-EU strategy defines overall African relations, the European Neighbourhood Policy governs relations with North Africa, and the Cotonou Agreement governs relations with Sub-Saharan Africa until it expires (in principle, when the post-Cotonou framework enters in force). The financing had also been channeled through various instruments till the previous MFF expired. North Africa, for example, had primarily been funded by the European Neighbourhood Instrument. In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa had been primarily funded by the European Development Fund, the EU's principal conduit for development cooperation in Africa that was not funded by the EU budget[10]. The new Global Europe Instrument in the new MFF encompasses development cooperation with Africa.

## 3. The Global Europe Instrument and Heading 6

The previous Heading 4 renamed Heading 6 'Neighbourhood and the World,' has been reorganized and streamlined, with a €98.4 billion budget (2018 prices). The most significant change is creating a new instrument, the NDICI, which has absorbed several formerly separate instruments, including the off-budget European Development Fund, as stated below (EDF). The EU's previous external investment framework has also been scaled up under the NDICI Regulation in order to boost sustainable development by attracting additional investment, which is desperately needed in post-Covid-19 times and the final decisive decade for achieving Agenda 2030 and the SDGs. As a separate instrument from NDICI, Humanitarian Aid continues to exist, and its legal foundation, Council Regulation No 1257/96, is still in effect. It has a budget of €10.3 billion, and the EU continues to be a global humanitarian donor. The standard foreign and security policy (CFSP), one of the primary vehicles for delivering the EU's foreign and security policy's 2016 Global Strategy, is funded independently, with a budget of €2.4 billion (2018 prices). A new off-budget vehicle, the European Peace Facility, would pay CFSP operations having military and defense consequences, substituting the African Peace Facility, which had been financing such efforts since 2003.

[9] Brozou, 2021b
[10] Jones, Friesen & Veron, 2020

## 4. Instrument for Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation (NDICI)

NDICI, often known as the "Global Europe Instrument," will be the EU's primary external finance instrument with a global reach for the next seven years. It focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the EU Neighbourhood. The Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Partnership Instrument, the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, and the EDF, which provided funding for Africa, are all part of it. Global Europe/NDICI is organized into three pillars, the most important of which is the geographical pillar, which devotes over half of its resources to Sub-Saharan Africa (around 37 percent of the overall funds)[11]. The thematic pillar supports the geographical pillar by focusing on global efforts and addressing global concerns. Rapid response actions are not pre-programmed, allowing for a quick response in an emergency. The emerging problems and priorities cushion is a reserve of flexibility that can respond to unforeseen situations, new requirements, or emerging issues and support new EU-led or international initiatives.

The NDICI Regulation establishes several expenditure goals, including devoting 30% of all money to climate-related activities, 93% of all monies to ODA, and 20% of ODA to social inclusion and human development. During the trilogue talks, Parliament emphasized that any migration-related initiatives must be consistent with the NDICI goals. Concerns have been raised, as noted by the EP's Development Committee in its opinion on the discharge for the implementation of the budgets of the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th EDFs for 2019, that development aid is increasingly being used to address the EU migration agenda, diverting it from its primary goal. Gender equality, environmental protection, digitization, good governance, stability, and peace are other priority issues. Given the massive financing gap for achieving the SDGs, as well as the positive independent evaluation of the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), launched in 2017, as "strongly relevant" to the investment needs in Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU Neighbourhood, the NDICI/Global Europe Regulation also includes a scaled-up version of the EFSD, a European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus, and an External Action Guarantee to cover a volume of up to 3.5 billion euros[12]. Both measures are critical in assisting EU partner nations in attracting additional investment by blending EU contributions with partner financing through blending projects, risk-sharing guarantees, and investment support. They will be programmed using the 'policy first' philosophy, contributing

[11] European Commission, 2021b
[12] European Commission, 2020

to critical EU priorities such as implementing the Green Deal's external component, digitization, jobs and growth, and inequalities reduction.

The NDICI/Global Europe Regulation will be critical in assisting the execution of the new Africa strategy and allowing the EU and its ACP allies to forge stronger coalitions in the face of major global problems. It will back the post-Cotonou deal, which will not include financial details because the EDF, the EU's primary source of funding for African cooperation, is now part of the EU's general budget. The rules that apply will be those of the EU general budget and the NDICI/Global Europe Instrument, which replaces some of the EDF's financial flexibilities, such as undistributed money ('cushion') and the carry-over of unused funds to the next financial year. The NDICI and its investment component, the EFSD+, will be implemented by the Commission's Directorate-General for International Partnerships.

## 5. MFF 2014-2020: Africa's Financing Instruments

Between 2014 and 2020, the MFF Heading 4 'Global Europe' included a variety of EU-funded instruments with both a geographical (targeting a group of countries) and a thematic (targeting a specific development issue) focus. Each instrument had its own set of country-specific programs, while others were regional or theme. The EU's programs ensured that democracy, peace, solidarity, stability, poverty reduction, prosperity, and natural resource protection were fostered in the EU's immediate neighborhood and globally. The fundamental EU budget financing mechanisms via which the EU funded its efforts in Africa in the 2014-2020 MFF, their principal aims, and the lead Commission directorate-general (DG) responsible for their programming and implementation are listed in Table 1.

The DCI, which covered collaboration with Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Africa, was the EU's largest development fund. A minor portion of it went to a pan-African program that covered the entire continent, as well as two thematic programs: global public goods and challenges and civil society organizations and local governments. With a budget of €845 million (2014-2020), the pan-African initiative was the first specialized EU financial tool to encompass Africa as a whole. In line with the joint Africa-EU strategy, it aims to foster the EU-Africa collaboration by contributing to the strategic areas of the 2014-2017 and 2018-2020 multiannual indicative programs. It embraced trans-regional, continental, and global initiatives in and with Africa while guaranteeing complementarity with other financial mechanisms.

Higher education, economic integration, migration, digitization, statistics, infrastructure, and governance were all given special attention in 2018-2019. In places where they bring value, it is generally implemented by the African Union (AU) Commission or specialized international organizations. The program, among other things, aided the successful conclusion of the AfCFTA negotiations in 2018 and established the EU as the AU's primary recognized partner in this endeavor. The introduction of the pan-African program was deemed necessary during the DCI evaluation in 2017, addressing a significant gap in the strategic cooperation between Africa and the EU and complementing existing finance mechanisms such as the EDF. The Commission details all EU spending programs for 2014-2020 in its performance overview. In February 2021, it published its 2020 Annual report on the implementation of the EU's external action instruments in 2019, outlining prominent variables of the EU's financial assistance for external action in 2019, such as its contribution to the UN 2030 Agenda implementation. Major crises in African nations such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan were covered by EU operations funded by the IcSP and supported by CFSP measures in 2019. In addition to the EU's geographical instruments and CSDP missions, the IcSP has been the principal external financing instrument for supporting security, peacebuilding, and conflict-prevention measures in partner countries.

## 6. The European Investment Plan (EIP)

Using financial instruments such as loans and guarantees supported by the EU budget grew under the 2014-2020 MFF. The release of the external investment plan, endorsed by an EU budget guarantee, in 2017 as an attempt to offer creative ways of galvanizing public and private sources of financing for development, with a focus on Africa and the EU Neighborhood, was a first, with the plan initially intended to address the root causes of migration. The European Investment Plan (EIP) is built on three pillars: 1) the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD); 2) technical assistance to governments and businesses in project preparation; and 3) enhancing the investment climate. The €5.1 billion EFSD is the EIP's finance arm, mobilizing funds for development projects through guarantees and blending (see diagram, left), which involves mixing EU grants with public and private-sector financing. Guarantees and blending have become more common in EU development assistance, mainly consisting of direct contributions to partner nations. The new EFSD Guarantee allows development banks and private investors to share investment risks with local entrepreneurs, who may then lend to them. Individual guarantees have been created for five sectors: small company financing, sustainable energy and connectivity, local currency lending, digitalization, and sustainable cities. Work in these areas complements other EU programs, including the European Green Deal. The investment is predicted to be worth ten times the amount of money invested. According to the 2019 EFSD Operational report, the targets have been raised upwards.

## 7. European Investment Bank (EIB)

The EIB has served as the EU's international development bank for decades, and its foreign investments have aided in creating stability, sustainable growth, and the battle against climate change. The EIB is a crucial partner in executing the EFSD and the Team Europe concept with a strong focus on Africa. The EIB accounts for about a third of all EU institutions' ODA. Outside the EU, EIB finance has totaled €78 billion in the last ten years, with €26.6 billion going to Africa. In 2020, the EIB planned to invest over €10 billion in development outside of Europe, with financing to Africa increased by 50% to nearly €5 billion across various sectors. Apart from the EIP, the EIB has financed investments in North Africa and South Africa through the ACP Investment Facility established under the Cotonou Agreement or the External Lending mandate[13].

## 8. Instruments for funding outside of the EU budget

Several off-budget intergovernmental and ad hoc hybrid instruments supplied central finance for Africa until the passage of the 2021-2027 MFF, in addition to financing mechanisms within the EU budget. The European Development Fund (EDF) is noteworthy since it is the EU's largest development fund and the primary source of funding for geographical cooperation with sub-Saharan African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries (except South Africa). While the EDF has functioned outside of the budget for decades, unexpected occurrences during the 2014-2020 MFF prompted the creation of new ad hoc instruments such as the EU trust funds for foreign action. In the new MFF, the EDF is now part of the NDICI, and trust funds are placed to continue until the end of 2021.

### a. The European Development Fund

Under the Cotonou Agreement, the EDF was the primary source of money for ACP countries. The EDF is funded outside the EU budget and by contributions from the EU Member States according to a particular allocation key. It spans several financial periods ranging from five to seven years; however, payments can be made over more extended periods. The 11th EDF, which runs concurrently with the 2014-2020 MFF, funds 75 ACP nations with a total budget of €30.5 billion, split around 80 percent between regional and intra-ACP theme programs[14]. Equatorial Guinea and Sudan were not eligible for aid since they had not signed the Cotonou

[13] European Commission, 2021e
[14] Jones, Friesen & Veron, 2020

Agreement's 2010 amendment, while South Africa is not eligible for EDF funding. The general structure for the EDF's programming and implementation is defined by a Council regulation, which aims to ensure compatibility with relevant EU development policy principles and frameworks. The EDF Committee, which comprises delegates from the EU Member States, controls and monitors the EDF's programming and implementation. DG INTPA is in charge of the European Commission. The long-standing question of whether the EDF should be included in the EU budget was eventually answered in the new MFF when it was put into the new Global Europe Instrument to improve coordination and coherence of procedures and flows to Africa as a whole.

## b. The African Peace Facility and its successor, the European Peace Facility (EPF)

A prerequisite for long-term development, peace, and security cooperation lies at the heart of the EU's engagement with Africa. The African Peace Facility has been the primary EU tool funded under the intra-ACP envelopes of the EDF since 2003, assisting African-led peace support operations, capacity-building activities, and initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism, due to the EU Treaties limiting the use of the EU budget for expenditures with military and defense implications. The APF was a pan-African initiative that funded continental, regional, and sub-regional operations; national-level initiatives were not eligible for funding. It supplemented regional and national EDF, IcSP (including the 2017 capacity-building in support of security and development program), trust funds, and CFSP military and civilian missions and operations.

The EU has allocated €3.5 billion to the APF since its inception, according to the 2019 APF annual report. By 2019, the EU had contracted €2.9 billion and disbursed €2.7 billion. In addition to the adjustments made in the new MFF, the EU is revamping how it finances African peace and security[15]. In 2021, the European Peace Facility, a new off-budget mechanism, gathered EU funding for peace and security programs with military or defense consequences, including the APF, under its umbrella (except for the non-military actions eligible for ODA, which the NDICI would cover). The EPF's €5 billion budget for 2021-2027 is approximately twice as much as the APF spent from 2004 to 2019; nevertheless, it has a global scope and is not solely for the African Union[16]. The EPF will also cover the collective costs of military missions and operations under the Common Security and Defense Policy. While the APF mostly channeled financing through African Union mechanisms, the EPF will allow for more

[15] European Commission, 2021b
[16] European Commission, 2021d

direct bilateral and multilateral engagement with African (groups of) nations and regional organizations.

### c. EU trust funds (EUTFs) focused on Africa

Unexpected developments, such as the migration crisis, prompted the establishment of EU trust funds during the 2014-2020 MFF. Trust funds were created "partly as a result of the EU budget being structurally underfinanced and insufficient possibilities to fund unexpected needs," according to a recent opinion of the EP's Committee on Budgetary Control on the implementation report on the EU trust funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Since January 2013, the Commission has been able to develop and administer multi-donor trust funds in the field of external actions to react to emergencies and finance actions based on shared objectives and reporting formats, thanks to a new Financial Regulation applicable to the EU budget. Trust funds have several advantages, including pooling additional resources from various sources (EU budget, Member States, third countries, EDF) and more flexibility, faster decision-making and implementation, better coordination, and increased EU visibility. However, their use has generated concerns about the EU budget's fragmentation and the need for adequate accountability. The Bêkou trust fund and the EU emergency trust fund for Africa are two of the four extant trust funds focused on Africa. Because they are slated to expire at the end of 2021, associated work will continue under the NDICI/Global Europe, which gives the EU budget more flexibility.

### d. The Bêkou Trust Fund of the European Union

The EUTF Bêkou was established in July 2014 to aid in the rehabilitation of the Central African Republic and to assist neighboring countries in dealing with the crisis' regional effects. The Bêkou trust fund has implemented several programs since its inception, and its resources have grown from the initial €64 million[17]. Essential services (health, food security, water, and sanitation) have been prioritized, but resources have also been allocated to rural development, economic recovery, and reconciliation. Moreover, half of the Central African Republic's population has already benefited from the trust fund. The Bêkou trust fund has strengthened and extended synergies with other EU institutions while remaining true to its objectives.

### e. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)

---

[17] European Commission, 2021a

The EUTF for Africa was created in response to the 2015 migratory crisis and to help implement the joint Valetta action plan[18]. The EUTF was billed as an emergency tool to manage and reorganize EU finances in response to «situations when experience has demonstrated that the inadequacy of local administrations coupled with a significant increase in the number of contributors necessitates robust international coordination[19]». It did not imply that more financing sources will be identified at the EU level. Instead, it pooled money from the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which were subsequently augmented by approximately €5 billion in commitments from member states. The EUTF window C, "North of Africa," includes the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs), as well as two other regional windows, the Sahel and Lake Chad (window A) and the Horn of Africa (window B) (window B).The EUTF has funded approximately 600 initiatives in 26 countries since its creation, totaling €4.8 billion in approved programming.

Decisions made in the North of Africa comprise about €900 million disbursed to Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt through 40 programs, which is comparable to 31% of the EU's Official Development Assistance budget in the region (34 percent in the Horn of Africa and 25 percent in the Sahel and Lake Chad). As a result, there's no denying that the EUTF was a game-changer in the EU financing environment. It not only established a focused instrument for external migration cooperation with a corresponding financial allocation, but it also advanced coordination between the EU and its member states on a hotly debated and potentially controversial issue. Several investigations and evaluations of the EUTF indicate that it has had at least three effects on EU-third-country relations. The EUTF has transformed "how work is done" for the first time, despite not revolutionizing how migration is dealt. The EUTF did not follow EU standard application and selection procedures because it was created under the strain of the so-called "migrant crisis" and as an emergency instrument. The governance structure was made of representatives from member states and the European Commission; however the European Parliament did not oversee the EUTF's expenditure because the instrument is not part of the EU budget, and the selection criteria are less specified than for normal EU funding.

[18] The Valletta Action Plan outlined five priority realms of cooperation: solving the underlying causative factors of irregular migration and establishing the benefits of migration; encouraging legal migration and mobility; bolstering security and asylum policies; countering human trafficking and migrant smuggling; and strengthening cooperation to enable the return and reintegration of irregular migrants.

[19] Zardo, 2021

Second, the EUTF has had an impact on the connection between the migration agenda and the African countries targeted for migration. Third, despite mounting evidence showing economic growth, particularly income-generating initiatives, is more likely to lower relocation costs and lead to increased emigration unless a nation reaches an upper-middle-income level, the EUTF has helped to bolstering the "root causes" narrative. According to a 2021 EUTF reflection study, it resulted in a "far more ambitious and long-term-oriented matrix of interventions." Its goals are to promote economic and job opportunities, community resilience, migration management, governance, and conflict prevention in the three windows it covers: the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa, and the North of Africa. The trust fund is used to fund programs that complement EDF-funded activities in several countries. Similarly, its goals have been generally aligned with the EU budget instruments that give a portion of its funding. The EUTF has sponsored over 500 projects in over 25 African nations. Migration is anticipated to account for around 51% of its funding. The NDICI will continue to sponsor migration-related initiatives with up to ten percent of its money in the new MFF.

## 9. References


- Bøås, M., Horký-Hluchář, O., & A., M.-E. (2020). *A comprehensive EU strategy for Africa.* European Parliament Think Tank. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5013af43-c190-11ea-b3a4-01aa75ed71a1
- Brozou, M. (2021a). Advancing EU-Africa cooperation in light of the African Continental Free Trade Area. ETTG. https://ettg.eu/publications/advancing-eu-africa-cooperation-in-light-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-area/
- Brozou, M. (2021b). *Towards a renewed Africa-Europe Partnership for Investment*. ETTG. https://ettg.eu/publications/towards-a-renewed-africa-europe-partnership-for-investment/
- Jones, A., Keijzer, N., Friesen, I., & Veron, P. (2020). *EU development cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa 2013–2018: Policies, funding, results*. ECDPM. https://ecdpm.org/publications/eu-development-cooperation-sub-saharan-africa-2013-2018-policies-funding-results/
- European Commission. (2021a). *Bêkou Trust Fund*. International Partnerships - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/programmes/bekou-trust-fund_en
- European Commission. (2021b). *African Peace Facility: African Union Peace & Security Operations boosted by an additional €800 million from the European Union*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/ip_19_343

- European Commission. (2021c). Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/funding-and-technical-assistance/neighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument-ndici_en
- European Commission. (2021d). *European Peace Facility*. Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en
- European Commission. (2021e). *EU and EDF annual accounts*. European Commission - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/eu-and-edf-annual-accounts_en sham
- European Commission. (2020). *European Commission welcomes political agreement on future €79.5*. International Partnerships - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/european-commission-welcomes-political-agreement-future-eu795-billion-new-instrument-finance-eu_en
- Osondu-Oti, A. (2020). *Testing an "All-Weather Friendship": China and Africa after Covid*. ISPI. https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/testing-all-weather-friendship-china-and-africa-after-covid-26946
- Pichon, E. (2021). *International Agreements in Progress - After Cotonou: Towards a new agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states | Think Tank | European Parliament*. European Parliament Think Tank. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698029
- The Africa-EU Partnership. (2021). *Financing the Partnership*. Africa-EU Partnership. https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/financing-partnership
- Zardo, F. (2021). *Planning the Future of the EU Trust Fund for Africa : EuroMeSCo – Euro-Mediterranean Research, Dialogue, Advocacy*. EUROMESCO. https://www.euromesco.net/publication/planning-the-future-of-the-eu-trust-fund-for-africa/